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This paper briefly outlines the development of Mon ethnicity as a politically salient 
characteristic, during the pre-colonial and colonial periods in Burma. It goes on to describe the 
emergence of Mon ethno-nationalist movements (both insurgent and non-armed) in the post-
independence period. The paper examines the ways in which nationalist elites have mobilized 
support around ideas of Mon ethnic identity, and the various political strategies adopted in 
relation to ‘others’ - including elaboration of a federalist platform, in alliance with other 
ethno-nationalist groups; cooperation with the ‘pan-Burmese’ democracy movement; and 
uneasy accommodations with the militarized state.  
 
The paper outlines the dynamics of armed ethnic conflict in ‘Monland’, and reviews the 
political and humanitarian impacts of this ‘low-intensity’ civil war, as well as positive and 
negative developments since the ceasefire agreed in 1995 between the military government 
and the New Mon State Party. It examines how Mon civil society groups in Burma have over the 
past decade promoted community development, and limited democratization ‘from below’, 
within the constraints of an oppressive and predatory state structure.  
 
The paper concludes with an assessment of the strategic options available to Mon and other 
ethno-nationalist communities in 2007. This includes a critical analysis of federalist politics, 
and the roles of armed ethnic groups. The arguments and analysis are primarily drawn from the 
author’s two books: Mon Nationalism and Civil War in Burma: the Golden Sheldrake 
(RoutledgeCurzon 2003; reprint edition 2005) and States of Conflict: Ethnic Politics in Burma 







Mon Nationalist Movements:  
insurgency, ceasefires and political struggle  
 
 
This paper briefly outlines the development of Mon ethnicity as a politically salient 
characteristic, during the pre-colonial and colonial periods in Burma.1 It goes on to 
describe the emergence of Mon ethno-nationalist movements (both insurgent and non-
armed) in the post-independence period. The paper examines the ways in which 
nationalist elites have mobilized support around ideas of Mon ethnic identity, and the 
various political strategies adopted in relation to ‘others’ - including elaboration of a 
federalist platform, in alliance with other ethno-nationalist groups; cooperation with 
the ‘pan-Burmese’ democracy movement; and uneasy accommodations with the 
militarized state.  
 
The paper outlines the dynamics of armed ethnic conflict in ‘Monland’, and reviews 
the political and humanitarian impacts of this ‘low-intensity’ civil war, as well as 
positive and negative developments since the ceasefire agreed in 1995 between the 
military government and the New Mon State Party (NMSP: the most important armed 
Mon group of recent years). It examines how Mon civil society groups in Burma 
(including the Buddhist sangha) have promoted community development, and 
democratization ‘from below’, within the constraints of an oppressive and predatory 
state structure.  
 
The paper concludes with an assessment of the strategic options available to Mon and 
other ethno-nationalist communities in 2007 (including in the context of the ‘saffron 
revolution of August-September this year, and its brutal suppression). This overview 
includes a critical analysis of federalist politics, and the roles of armed ethnic groups. 
The arguments and analysis are primarily drawn from the author’s two books: Mon 
Nationalism and Civil War in Burma: the Golden Sheldrake (RoutledgeCurzon 2003; 




The Problematics of Identity 
The history of Burma has been fraught with violent conflict, much of which has been 
inspired by notions of ethnicity. Categories of ethnic identity have often been 
regarded as unproblematic phenomena, reflecting unchanging characteristics, which 
define an individual or group of people. However, the nature and significance of 
ethnicity as an identity category have changed over the centuries, depending on 
political and economic circumstances.  
 
                                                 
1 In June 1989 the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) military junta re-named 
the state Myanmar Naing-ngan. At the same time, a number of other place names were 
changed - e.g. Rangoon became Yangon, Pegu became Bago, Moulmein became Mawlamyine In 
some cases, these changes represented a ‘Burmanisation’ of indigenous names; in others, the 
new word more closely resembled local pronunciation than had the old colonial-era 
Romanization.  
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During the pre-colonial period, ethnic identity, based on language and cultural 
inheritance, was only one of a number of themes in social and economic life. The 
primary marker of individual and communal identity was position in the tributary 
hierarchy - i.e. where  people lived (Ava or Pegu) and what they did (peasant or 
prince) was of more importance in determining identity than the language spoken at 
home or in the market.  
 
Mon National Identity2 
Well over one million Mon-speaking people live in Burma and parts of neighbouring 
Thailand, where today they constitute ethnic minorities.3 However, this has not always 
been the case.  
 
It is beyond the scope of this paper to sketch the complex, fascinating - and 
sometimes controversial - history of the pre-colonial Mon civilization. A number of 
writers have described the rise of the Mon civilization in lower Burma in the first 
millennium CE (e.g. Guillon 1999; see also Aung-Thwin 2005). Better-documented are 
the fourteenth-sixteenth century Mon kingdom of Hongsawatoi, centred at Pegu, 
which briefly re-emerged as an important power in the eighteenth century (Guillon 
1999).  
 
Mon civilisation was among the most influential in pre-colonial Southeast Asia, acting 
as a vector in the transmission of Theravada Buddhism and Indianised political culture 
to the region. This civilising role helps to explain the enduring prestige attached to the 
Mon heritage. Mon nationalists have looked back to the classical era as a golden age - 
a source of inspiration and legitimisation.  
 
However, as noted above, ethnicity was only one factor among several in determining 
identity in pre-modern Southeast Asia. As Victor Lieberman (1978: 480) has 
demonstrated, the ‘Mon’ kingdoms of lower Burma were in fact expressions of 
something more complex: "the correlation between cultural, i.e. ethnic, identity and 
political loyalty was necessarily very imperfect, because groups enjoying the same 
language and culture were fragmented by regional ties." Lieberman demonstrates that 
religion, culture, region and hierarchy status all helped to determine personal, group 
and regime identity in pre-colonial times. As authority was vested in the person of the 
monarch, it was he (or in the case of the great Mon Queen Shinsawbu, she), rather 
than any abstract idea of ethnic community, that commanded primary loyalty. A 
Burman king could act as the patron of Mon princely clients, and vice-versa. 
 
For example, the leader of the last great Mon uprising in pre-colonial Burma, the Smin 
Daw Buddhaketi, who drove the Burmans from Pegu and ruled much of lower Burma 
from 1740-47 (Gravers 2007: 9-10) may actually have been a Karen (PaO) or Shan 
speaker. More important at the time however, were his (probably fabricated) royal 
credentials, and status as an aspirant Buddha (or min laung). The Smin Daw drew 
support from various ‘ethnic’ groups - while Burman, Karen and Mon clients of 
‘Burman’ king opposed his rebellion. However, Lieberman (1978: 480) does concede 
                                                 
2 Section based on South (2005: Part 1 & 2008: Ch.1). 
3 The total Mon population in Burma is probably about one-and-a-half million people. At least 
30% of those living in Mon State are Burmans, Tavoyans, Pwo and  S’ghaw Karen, and Bengali 
Muslims. Among the Mon population, sizeable groups live in adjoining areas of Karen State, and 
to a lesser extent also in Pegu Division. (South 2005: 57-63 & 2008). 
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that the edicts of king Alaungphaya made a clear ethnic distinction between his own 
(Burman) followers and those of the Mon (or ‘Talaing’, as they were derogatively 
called by the Burmans). Indeed, ethnic polarisation accelerated rapidly under 
Alaungphaya.  
 
Lieberman’s caveats notwithstanding, Mon and Burman ethno-linguistic identities were 
well-established before Europeans began to arrive in significant numbers in Southeast 
Asia, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Although the adoption of such 
ethnonyms did not imply that individuals or communities subscribed to a homogenous 
political-cultural identity, people have nevertheless represented themselves as either 
'Mon' or 'Burman', depending on the political situation. Kings, colonialists and modern 
politicians have used such ethnic labels to mobilize and control power bases. 
 
 
Colonialism and the Consolidation of Ethnic Identity  
British rule in lower Burma lasted for more than a century, from 1826-1949 (not 
including the Japanese occupation of 1942-45). During the British and Japanese 
periods, Burma was affected by huge social, political and economic changes. The 
creation of a modern, bureaucratic state involved processes of administrative 
standardization and the objectification of previously fluid and hazily-defined social 
realities, such as the concept-category of ethnicity.  
 
As Robert Taylor (2006: 9) notes, “whether intentionally or not, the consequence of 
the policies pursued by the British reified ethnicity and made religion an issue in the 
politics of Myanmar.” Over time, the ‘rationalisation of the state’ and introduction of 
capitalist economic measures led to the breakdown of traditional social bonds, and the 
reformation of patron-client relations. The changing socio-economic environment 
caused Mon and other predominantly lowland peoples to change their patterns of 
residence, livelihood and education. Indeed, so great was the erosion of Mon culture 
and language under the British that, by the time the colonialists departed, there were 
very few Mon speakers still living in the Irrawaddy Delta or Pegu, the ancient Mon 
homelands. According to the last colonial census, by 1931 all but 3% of the Mon 
population was confined to Amherst District, in what is today central Mon State (South 
2005: ch.6). 
 
Following the Third Anglo-Burmese War of 1885, the British divided the colony into the 
central lowlands of ‘Burma Proper’, where the great majority of Mon and Burmese 
speakers lived, and a mountainous horseshoe of ethnic minority-populated ‘Frontier 
Areas’, on the periphery of the state. The economic changes and infrastructure 
developments of the colonial period did more to integrate lowland Burman/Burmese 
society, than it did to link Burma Proper with the highland Frontier Areas.  
 
The adoption of Burmese as the language of state accelerated processes of 
assimilation, at least in Burma Proper. Over the course of the nineteenth century, 
large numbers of Mon speakers came to adopt the Burmese language, and associated 
forms of political culture. The 1921 census recorded 324,000 Mons "by race", but only 
189,000 speakers of Mon. The descendants of these non-Mon speakers would today be 
classified as ethnic Burmans - i.e. as Burmese speaking citizens of a relatively new 
entity: the colony (and potential state) of Burma (South 2005: chs.2 & 6).  
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The British generally treated the ancient Mon culture and history with benign neglect, 
while the bulk of official attention focused on potentially restive ‘hill-tribes’. Colonial 
rule fostered the emergence of self-consciously distinct ethnic minority groups, who 
were encouraged to identify themselves in opposition to the Burman majority (South 
2008: ch.1). Second and third generation elites from within these ‘imagined 
communities’ went on to lead Burma’s ethnic nationalist movements in the turbulent 
years directly preceding and following the Japanese invasion of 1941. 
 
 
From Independence to Military Rule 
Burma gained independence on 4 January 1948, six months after the assassination of 
the independence leader, General Aung San. The first decade of independence was 
marked by a chaotic period of parliamentary politics, and widespread insurgency. The 
late 1940s and ’50s saw large numbers of often loosely-organized communist and 
ethnic nationalist militias take up arms against the ‘Rangoon Government’ (which at 
times controlled only the capital and its immediate environs). The remnants of civil 
war in Burma today constitute the longest running armed conflict in the world. 
 
By the mid-1950s, the Tatmadaw (armed forces) had managed to push the insurgents 
back to the mountains and borderlands. The civilian administration had been secured, 
but at the cost of empowering the army, and convincing key Tatmadaw leaders that 
only they could save the country from insurgency.  
 
The military assumed control of Burma 1958-60, as a ‘caretaker government’. 
Following a brief return to civilian rule under U Nu (1960-62), military rule run the 
country continuously since 1962, when General Ne Win’s Tatmadaw  again seized 
power. From 1962-74 Ne Win ruled Burma through a Revolutionary Council. Following 
the promulgation of a new constitution in 1974, he continued to dominate the country, 
via the Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP), which continued the trend of the 
1960s towards international political and international isolation. Ne Win’s disastrous 
‘Burmese Way to Socialism’ transformed the once-vibrant economy into one of the 
least developed countries in the world. 
 
Meanwhile, ethnic and communist insurgents controlled much of the countryside. 
Their ‘liberated zones’ constituted unofficial de facto mini-states, with in some cases 
quite substantial administrations - including for example, departments of health and 
education, which attempted to provide minimal services to the populations under 
their control. 
 
Militarization and Nation/State-building4 
In the militarised context of post-independence rebellion and counter-insurgency, the 
Tatmadaw moved to capture this state, in order to defend a particular idea of the 
nation, the origins of which lie in the colonial era and the Second World War (Callahan 
2003). Despite ostensible changes in ideology and political programme, the key 
concept of an independent nation, identified with the Burman cultural centre, and a 
strong state, with the capacity to shape state-society relations, has remained a 
constant.  
 
                                                 
4 This section is developed from South (in Gravers 2007). 
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The Tatmadaw regards itself as the principal agent for implementing policy upon - and 
defending the state from - the complexities of Burmese society. This exercise in 
nation/state-building has seen diverse (and according to the military, divisive) 
minority cultures, histories and socio-political aspirations subsumed under a 
homogenizing ‘Burmese’ national identity. In a rare public justification of such 
policies, shortly after seizing power in 1962, General Ne Win denied the need for a 
separate Mon culture and ethnicity, arguing that the Mon tradition had been fully 
incorporated into Burmese national culture, and thus required no distinct expression 




The earliest expressions of armed Mon nationalist feeling were the great uprisings of 
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries - although these should not be interpreted 
as manifestations of a simple ethnic identity (South 2005: ch.5). During the last years 
of colonial rule, in 1939, Mon intellectuals and cultural revivalists founded the All 
Ramanya Mon Association (ARMA), the first explicitly Mon socio-cultural organization of 
modern times, which was revived in the mid-1940s. (‘Ramanya’ is a variation on the 
traditional name for the pre-colonial Mon civilization: ibid. ch.6). 
 
Following the devastation of the Second World War, in the chaotic years before and 
after Burmese independence, elites within the Mon, Karen and other minority 
communities articulated claims to social and political autonomy, on the basis of 
ethnicity (South 2005: ch.7). As Gravers (1999: 145) puts it, “identity thus becomes 
the foundation of political rights.” He calls this process “ethnicicism … the separation 
or seclusion of ethnic groups from nation states in the name of ethnic freedom … 
where cultural differences are classified as primordial and antagonistic.” 
 
The first  explicitly political Mon nationalist organization was the United Mon 
Association (UMA), established in November 1945 by Nai Po Cho, a Moulmein-born 
Christian and English lecturer at Rangoon University (South 2005: ch.7). Among the 
UMA’s lasting contributions to the Mon nationalist movement was the adoption of Mon 
National Day (a lunar event, occurring each February), celebrating the legendary 
foundation of Hongsawatoi. The Mon nationalist movement had not yet articulated a 
militant separatist agenda. Campaigning for official recognition of the Mon language 
and the establishment of a Mon polity within the emerging Union of Burma, the UMA 
positioned itself as a distinctly Mon contribution to the struggle for Burma’s 
independence.  
 
The UNA worked closely with Aung San and U Nu’s Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom 
League (AFPFL), which was dominated by Burma Independence Army (BIA) veterans 
who had fought alongside, and later against, the Japanese. However, there was from 
the beginning a tendency to factionalism within the Mon nationalist ranks, and conflict 
soon arose due to Nai Po Cho’s closeness to the Burman-dominated AFPFL.  
 
The BIA veterans in the AFPFL and Tatmadaw insisted that Burma was a unitary state, 
and strongly opposed any breakaway entity, such as that already proposed by the 
Karen nationalists. Their counsel prevailed, and the British failed to make good on 
their war-time promises to Karen leaders, of post-war independence - or at least 
autonomy – for ‘Karenistan’.  
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In an attempt to address the ‘ethnic question’, in February 1947 Aung San convened a 
Conference of the Nationalities, at Panglong in Shan State. In exchange for their 
acceptance of a new Union of Burma, the government-in-waiting issued guarantees of 
autonomy to Chin, Kachin, Karenni and Shan leaders present at the gathering. 
However, only representatives of those peoples identified by the British as resident in 
the Frontier Areas were invited to the conference, which concluded on 12 February 
(celebrated since as Burma’s Union Day). As this restriction was based on a rather 
simplistic identification of ethnicity with geographical location, neither the Mon nor 
the Arakanese-Rakhine were represented at Panglong. 
 
By early 1947 many Mon politicians had become alienated from Aung San and the 
AFPFL, and their lack of support for ethnic minority aspirations. Radical Mon leaders 
increasingly preferred to throw in their lot with the ambitious Karen leadership which, 
sensing that the promises to be made at Panglong would never be fulfilled, had played 
little part in the conference.  
 
Elections to a Constituent Assembly were held in April 1947, but these were boycotted 
by the majority (but not all: South 2008) of Karen and Mon nationalist parties. In 
August the Mon Freedom League (MFL) was established, and declared that  “the Mons 
now demand their full birth-right for creation of a Mon State exercising full right of 
self-determination.” The bulk of the Mon nationalist movement was now demanding 
full independence from Burma (Nai Shwe Kyin  1999). However, several prominent Mon 
to politicians continued work with the AFPFL, hoping to promote Mon rights within the 
mainstream of Union politics (South 2005: ch.7). 
 
In late 1947 the MFL and the recently-formed Mon Affairs Organisation (MAO) were 
superseded by a new group, the Mon United Front (MUF) - which Nai Po Cho’s UMA 
refused to join, accusing it of separatist and militant tendencies. Soon afterwards, the 
first Mon armed organization of modern times was established - the Mon National 
Defence Organisation (MNDO). This militia was modelled on the Karen National 
Defence Organisation (KNDO), which had been founded the previous year, as the 
armed wing of the Karen National Union (KNU - established in February 1947). 
 
In July-August 1948 the MUF-MNDO raided the village of Zarthabyin, and later briefly 
occupied Moulmein and Thaton towns, together with the KNU. Although the siege of 
Moulmein lasted only a week (ibid.), this marked the beginning of a Mon separatist 
insurgency, which got fully underway the following year, after the KNU went 
underground in January 1949. 
 
By 1950, in addition to two different communist factions, the Mon, Karen, Karenni and 
Pa-O ethnic nationalists, together with the Muslim mujaheed of Arakan, were also in 
revolt. However, with a few exceptions - such as the Mon-Karen alliance - the various 
insurgent groups failed to co-ordinate their actions, and were often in direct 
competition for control of strategic positions and resources. The military situation on 
the ground was extremely complex. Numerous militias patrolled the countryside, and 
were often only loosely-aligned with or controlled by any central leadership.  
 
In the early 1950s Mon nationalist politicians from Burma started to cultivate contacts 
with Mon communities in Thailand, and through these the Thai armed forces. In late 
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1951, Nai Ba Lwin and colleagues re-organised the Mon armed groups as the Mon 
People’s Solidarity Group (MPSG), forerunner of the Mon People's Front (MPF). Nai 
Ngwe Thein (later Nai Aung Htun) was chairman of the new group, with Nai Tun Thein 
as General Secretary. (1951 was also the year that Nai Ba Lwin adopted the nom de 
guerre ‘Nai Shwe Kyin’, in honour of the Shwegyin Buddhist sect, renowned for its 
strictness and discipline.) 
 
Although it continued to be handicapped by factionalism, the MPF was the most 
powerful Mon insurgent force of the ‘parliamentary era’ (1948-58). It was also the first 
organisation to explicitly demand the creation of an “Independent Sovereign State … 
of Monland.”  
 
A combination of fiery nationalist rhetoric, plunder gained during the civil war and the 
power of the gun allowed the insurgents to mobilize sections of the rural peasantry to 
the ethno-nationalist cause. However, by the late 1950s, the armed Mon nationalists 
hade succumbed to serious ideological divisions, with elements among the MPF 
leadership led by Nai Shwe Kyin subscribing to more left-wing views than the majority. 
A more immediate concern was the insurgents’ failure to bring sustain early victories 
on the battlefield. After a series of military set-backs, by early 1958 the MPF 
leadership was ready to negotiate a ceasefire with the government.  
 
Prime Minister U Nu hoped to gain political support (to leverage internal power 
struggles within the AFPFL), and Buddhist merit, by resolving the country’s 
outstanding security issues. He therefore offered a conditional amnesty to Burma’s 
various insurgent groups. Crucially, for the first time, he also proposed the formation 
of two new Union States, for the Mon and Rakhine-Arakanese. Needing no further 
encouragement, in July 1958 MPF leaders agreed a ceasefire with the Tatmadaw. 
  
In total some 5,500 insurgents accepted U Nu’s ‘peace package’, including about one 
thousand MPF fighters. For a few months, the mainstream Mon nationalists enjoyed 
the benefits of legality, and seemed to be on the verge of real political breakthroughs. 
In August 1958 Nai Aung Htun and the MPF leadership met with their old colleagues in 
the UMA. Further meetings were conducted throughout the month with the ARMA, the 
Mon sangha and students, and U Nu’s lieutenants. The ethno-nationalists were able to 
establish a series of Mon language schools, and competed fairly successfully in 
elections from ‘within the legal fold’ (in 1960: ibid.). However, the military coup of 
1958 disrupted their activities, and Ne Win’s take-over in 1962 put an end to efforts to 
work within the mainstream of Burmese politics, until the 1990s. 
 
The New Mon State Party 
The day after the MPF’s ‘surrender’, Nai Shwe Kyin and a small group of followers 
established the New Mon State Party (NMSP). According to Nai Shwe Kyin (NMSP 1985), 
the NMSP - which was to be in the vanguard of the armed struggle for Monland for the 
next forty years - aimed “to establish an independent sovereign state unless the 
Burmese government is willing to permit a confederation of free nationalities 
exercising the full right of self-determination inclusive of right of secession." 
 
Over the following decades, the NMSP and its armed wing, the Mon National Liberation 
Army (MNLA, established 1971) suffered many set-backs, while retaining the broad 
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support of large sections of the Mon community. (For a detailed history of Mon 
nationalism and civil war in Burma, see South 2005; see also Martin Smith 1999.)  
 
In its early years, the NMSP received considerable support from the much larger and 
better-resourced KNU. In 1976 the KNU and allies established the National Democratic 
Front (NDF), Burma’s most effective ethnic insurgent alliance, with its headquarters at 
Mannerplaw. In a major policy shift, in 1984 the NDF changed its position from one of 
principled secessionism (i.e. the advocacy of outright independence) to a demand for 
substantial autonomy for ethnic nationality states within a Federal Union of Burma. 
This was an important change in emphasis: Ne Win and the Tatmadaw had accused the 
insurgents of scheming to wreck the Union. Now though, the ethnic nationalists were 
aiming at a democratic, federal transformation of the Union, rather than a total 
repudiation of the state of Burma.  
 
Soon after re-establishing itself in the mid-1960s, the NMSP organised a school system, 
which reflected the traditional importance of education in Mon Buddhist culture, and 
of language to ascriptions of ethnic identity. The Mon National Schools played a key 
role in the NMSP’s projection of a distinctly Mon national culture, underpinning the 
party’s secessionist (and later, federalist) policies. As the Thailand-based Human 
Rights Foundation of Monland (HRFM), observes (The Mon Forum August 1998), the 
state and NMSP education systems’ objectives have conflicting aims: 
 
“The government education system aims to implement government’s protracted 
assimilationist policy by pushing the non-Burman ethnic students to learn and speak 
Burmese.… The main objectives of the Mon education system are to preserve and 
promote Mon literature … Mon culture and history, to not forget the Mon identity.”  
 
The manner in which ‘ordinary’ Mon people have responded to the nationalist agenda 
is largely unknown. The great majority of Mon-speakers are poor rice farmers, and 
day-to-day survival is their prime consideration. However, the Tatmadaw has played a 
part in affirming a distinct Mon identity: villagers have routinely been persecuted 
because of their presumed ethnicity, and as a result many have had little choice but to 
flee to NMSP-controlled territory. If nothing else, the displacement and flight of 
villagers to border areas, where they are dependant on the NMSP for basic security 
and the provision of minimal services (and sometimes food), is likely to have deepened 
perceptions of the Burmese state as radically ‘other,’ and reinforced civilians’ public 
identification with a distinct Mon ethnicity (see Lang 2002). 
 
Parties to the civil war in Burma have tended to define themselves in opposition to 
each other. The on-going insurgency has served as a pretext for the expansion of 
Tatmadaw powers, and the militarization of state and society, which in turn has 
further provoked the incidence of rebellion. These cycles of conflict have seen the 
emergence of hard-liners on all sides.  
 
For many insurgent groups, identity and the claim to legitimacy have come to reside in 
the act of rebellion itself. By the 1970s, the civil war had become institutionalised, 
and in many cases the revolutionaries began to resemble warlords - “strongmen able 
to control an area and exploit its resources while at the same time keeping a weak 
central authority at bay” (Duffield 2001: 175). The political culture of the liberated 
zones reflected the political economy of these conflict areas, and the largely 
extractive nature of many insurgent groups’ relations to natural resources and the 
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peasantry (their ethnic minority brethren, in whose name the revolution was being 
fought). Life in the ‘liberated zones’ thus became characterised by top-down tributary 
political systems, similar to those in government-controlled areas, aspects of which 
recalled pre-colonial forms of socio-political organisation (South 2005: 129-30 & 341-
42). 
 
In particular, insurgent commanders were quick to suppress perceived schisms in their 
ranks, and to discourage the expression of diverse opinions, and socio-political 
initiatives beyond the control of militarised insurgent hierarchies. As David Steinberg 
observes (in Ganesan & Kyaw Yin Hlaing 2007: 119), “a ‘loyal opposition’ is an 
oxymoron when power is personalized.” One consequence of the obsession with unity 
has been the endemic factionalism of Burmese opposition politics, with most groups 
unable to accommodate socio-political (or personality) differences among their 
members. Such tendencies have led to the suppression of pluralism in ethnic 
opposition circles, and the development of rigid political cultures in non-state 
controlled areas.  
 
Thus, since the 1950s, aspects of resistance to the forces of assimilation have 
themselves taken on the characteristics of ‘cultural corporatism’. Ethnic nationalist 




1988 and 1990: hope and despair 
As a result of nationwide protests which gripped Burma between March-June 1988, 
New Win stepped down from power. For a while, in August 1988, it seemed that 
‘people’s power’ might prevail, and usher in a new era of democracy in Burma. 
However, in mid-September the Tatmadaw massacred thousands of unarmed citizens, 
while re-imposing its control over the country, in the name of the State Law and Order 
Restoration Council (SLORC).  
 
In a surprise move - which owed much to international condemnation of its brutal 
suppression of the democracy movement - in May 1990 the SLORC held elections. 
These were won by the National League for Democracy (NLD), led by Aung San Suu Kyi 
- the daughter of independence hero Aung San. However, the generals refused to 
allow the NLD and its allies to form a government, and instead imprisoned several 
hundred more civilians.  
 
Since 1992, the regime has been dominated by Senior General Than Shwe, 
Commander-in-Chief of the Tatmadaw. In November 1997 the junta was re-configured, 
as the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC). By the turn of the new 
millennium, the military Government had greater control over Burma than any 
previous regime. However,  military rule did not go unchallenged - even on the streets 
of Yangon and other cities. 
 
A Boost for the Border-based Insurgents  
Between 1988-90, some 10,000 students and other refugees from the democracy 
uprising - and the 1990 elections and their fall-out - fled to border areas controlled by 
the Mon, Karen, Karenni and Kachin insurgents. They established a series of camps, 
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where ‘student soldiers’ received basic military training and supplies from the battle-
hardened insurgents.  
 
The events of 1988-90 had focused international attention on the situation in Burma, 
and it seemed that at last a degree of unity had emerged between the ethnic 
insurgents and the previously largely urban-orientated, Burman-dominated pro-
democracy opposition. The new alliance represented a real threat to the legitimacy of 
the SLORC.  
 
In November 1988 the NDF (including the NMSP) and twenty other anti-SLORC groups 
formed the Democratic Alliance of Burma (DAB), a broad-based, joint ethnic minority-
Burman opposition front. In the DAB ‘liberated zones’, the early 1990s witnessed a 
degree of optimism absent from the ethnic insurgencies for more than a decade. 
According to the eminent Burma scholar, Joseph Silverstein (in Carey 1997:129-30):  
 
“during this time, the centre of Burmese politics was gradually shifting to the border 
area capital (that is, Mannerplaw), where the KNU and its guests, the DAB and the 
NCGUB, had their headquarters. In this process, a new national politics was beginning 
to emerge which had the potential for re-shaping the relations between the ethnic 
minorities and the Burmans on the basis of national unity and peaceful democratic 
politics”.  
 
Unfortunately however - as Silverstein later recognized - this optimism among border-
based opposition groups and their supporters was short-lived. Following the collapse of 
the Communist Party of Burma (CPB) in 1989 (see below), the armed opposition found 
itself weaker militarily than at any time since independence. The next decade would 
see the end-game in Burma’s complex and protracted civil war, played out along the 
Thailand border. Meanwhile, opposition political formations became increasingly 
reliant on refuge in neighbouring countries, and exile overseas. Indeed, the patronage 
of foreign governments and donors kept the exile alliance afloat longer than might 
otherwise have been expected.  
 
In December 1990 the DAB and the National League for Democracy [Liberated Area] 
(NLD-LA) joined forces with the National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma 
(NCGUB), a 'government-in-exile' established at Mannerplaw in December 1990. In 1992 
this alliance became the National Council of the Union of Burma (NCUB), the highest 
body of the armed resistance, and opposition-in-exile (South 2005: ch.11). The 
following decade, in 2001 the Ethnic Nationalities Council (ENC) was established, to 
prepare ethnic nationality groups for 'tripartite dialogue' between ethnic groups, the 
military regime, and the NLD. During its Fourth Council in April-May 2006, the ENC was 
reorganized along State lines. By 2007, representatives of the Mon and the six other 
‘major nationality groups’ (except the Kachin) had prepared draft state constitutions, 
thereby building capacities for future constitutional negotiations (South 2008: ch.3). 
 
 
Beyond the Border 
Since 1991, the UN General Assembly has called annually for a tri-partite solution to 
Burma’s problems, involving the military government, ethnic nationality 
representatives, and Aung San Suu Kyi’s NLD. Of these there potential parties to 
dialogue, the ethnic nationalist bloc is the most diverse, and has not always presented 
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a coherent political platform. Consequently, its leaders have risked being marginalised 
in discussions over the country’s political future.  
 
The ethnic nationalist community in Burma is composed of three broad sectors: 
1. Insurgent groups still at war with the military government (including the KNU), 
most of which are members of the rump NDF, and support exile political 
formations; 
2. Armed ethnic organizations which have agreed ceasefires since 1989; 
3. The United Nationalities Alliance (UNA), established in 2002, and representing 
sixty-seven ethnic nationality candidates elected in 1990.  
 
Most UNA members had been part of the loosely organized United Nationalities League 
for Democracy (UNLD), the umbrella group of ethnic nationalist parties which 
contested the 1990 election. In 1990, under the Bo Aung Kyaw Street Declaration, the 
UNLD and NLD agreed in principle to establish a democratic federal union of Burma 
(see below). Like the UNLD, the UNA has always worked closely with the NLD, and the 
mainstream, urban-based democracy movement in Burma. Prominent member-parties 
include the Mon National Democratic Front (MNDF), with 5 MPs-elect; the Shan 
Nationalities League for Democracy (SNLD), with 22 MPs-elect; and the Arakan League 
for Democracy (ALD), with 11 seats.  
 
The MNDF was established in 1988. Although it was outlawed in 1992, it continued to 
be led by two veteran Mon politicians, Nai Tun Thein and Nai Ngwe Thein, who had 
been prominent members of the MPF in the 1950s, but had not followed Nai Shwe Kyin 
back underground to join the insurgent NMSP. Instead, the MNDF leaders had bided 
their time, before re-emerging in the heady days of 1988-90, to lead a Mon political 
movement  which aimed to work alongside the mainstream (NLD-led) pan-Burmese 
democracy movement (South 2005: ch.9). 
 
None of the UNLD/UNA member-groups participated in the government-organized 
National Convention (see below). Their absence - and that of the NLD - created a 
political opening for the emergence of a new generation of ethnic nationalist 
politicians, associated with the groups which had agreed ceasefires with the 
government since 1989.  
 
 
The Ceasefire Movement  
Until 1989, the Tatmadaw had been fighting two inter-connected civil wars - one 
against the ethnic nationalist insurgents, the other against the CPB. With the collapse 
of the latter in early 1989, the communist ‘Peoples Army’ disintegrated into four main 
ethnic militias, representing its Kokang, Wa, Kachin and Shan-Lahu elements (South 
2008: ch.5). 
 
The NDF sent delegates to seek an alliance with the ex-CPB groups, but - after 
decades of war - they found the new military government’s offer more attractive. The 
SLORC Secretary-1, and head of Military Intelligence, (then) Major-General Khin Nyunt, 
devised a classic divide-and-rule strategy, under which ceasefire agreements were 
struck with individual insurgent groups, while the SLORC refused to negotiate with any 
joint front, such as the NDF or DAB. 
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Between 1989-95, ceasefire arrangements were brokered with some twenty-five 
insurgent organisations, starting with the ex-CPB militias. With their former 
communist foes in northern Shan State neutralized, the new military government could 
concentrate its forces against the ethnic rebels and their Mannerplaw alliance. From 
1991, agreements were struck with several NDF member groups. At least a dozen local 
militias also agreed unofficial truces with the Tatmadaw during this period, including 
several armed factions which had split from mainstream NDF groups.  
 
In the case of some NDF member organizations - e.g. the Kachin Independence 
Organization (KIO) in 1994 and the NMSP the following year (see below) - ceasefires 
were negotiated under pressure from the Thai and Chinese authorities. Mostly 
however, these groups agreed to end hostilities because of the Tatmadaw’s military 
superiority, because of a deep war weariness among both the civilian population and 
their leaders, and in expectation of receiving development and economic assistance 
from the government and international community.  
 
In most cases, the ex-insurgents were allowed to retain their arms (but see below), 
and granted de facto autonomy, and control of sometimes extensive blocks of 
territory, in recognition of the military situation on the ground. The military-political 
space created by the ceasefires also gave the ex-insurgents access to (if not control 
over) areas and populations which they were previously denied, and opportunities to 
organize among communities, which they could only contact clandestinely, before the 
cessation of armed conflict.   
 
The NMSP Ceasefire 
In 1990, following the fall of the NMSP headquarters near Three Pagodas Pass, the first 
regular Mon refugee camps were established in Thailand, where nearly 50,000 Karen 
and Karenni refugees were already living along the border, further to the north. By 
1995, the Thai military authorities had more-or-less forcibly repatriated all but 2500 of 
the nearly 10,000 Mon refugees, moving them into the NMSP-controlled ‘liberated 
zones’. (UNHCR refused to criticize this case of refoulement.) By pushing the civilian 
victims of the civil war back across the border, the Royal Thai Army and National 
Security Council pressured the NMSP into agreeing a ceasefire with Yangon, which in 
turn would open the way for the economic exploitation of newly pacified parts of 
lower Burma (see COHRE 2007). 
 
Ceasefire negotiations between the NMSP and SLORC, which began in late 1993, were 
finalized on 29 June 1995. The terms of this truce were similar to those agreed with 
the KIO the previous year, under which the ex-insurgents would continue to control 
specified areas, in recognition of the situation on the ground. The NMSP was granted 
twelve (mostly adjacent) cantonments, constituting a ceasefire zone spread out along 
the Ye River in southern Mon State (and including parts of Tavoy District in Tenasserim 
Division, which the party was supposed to vacate the year after the ceasefire - but in 
fact still occupied, more than a decade later). The NMSP also continued to administer 
two small, but prosperous and fairly densely populated, ceasefire zones further to the 
north, in Moulmein and Thaton Districts (South 2005: ch.11 & 17). 
 
At the time of the ceasefire, the government offered the NMSP some development 
assistance. General Khin Nyunt also promised that the human rights situation in Mon 
State would improve.  
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For a decade after the ceasefire, the government provided the NMSP with 3.5 million 
Kyat (c. US$3500) a month (and sometimes rice too), to replace lost revenues, as a 
result of the party having access to less income from taxation. However, this financial 
support was terminated in mid-2005, due to the SPDC’s dissatisfaction with the NMSP’s 
strongly articulated demands, voiced at the National Convention (see below). At 
around the same time, a logging concession in the Kanni area, on the Ye River -  which 
benefited the NMSP leadership, if not the local population - was also cancelled by the 
regime. 
  
Although critics have accused ceasefire group leaders of profiting financially from 
these agreements, this has generally only been true of narco-trafficking militias in 
northern Burma. Since the ceasefires, the NMSP’s coffers have been depleted, due to 
reduced opportunities to collect taxes in areas previously patrolled by their troops, 
combined with their leaders’ inability to exploit the few economic openings presented 
by the post-ceasefire situation. The ex-insurgents have not demonstrated much 
commercial acumen: while the NMSP-controlled Rehmonya International Company 
made some money from short-term logging and fishing licenses, its trading and 
transport ventures have not flourished.  
 
Together with the KIO and some other ceasefire groups, the NMSP has repeatedly 
called for political engagement with the government. However, since the mid-1990s, 
the party has tended to oscillate between two strategic poles: at key moments, the 
NMSP has supported the NLD, attempting to pressure the government into reform. 
However, party leaders have often been forced to back down, and accept the 
government line. Unsurprisingly, such inconsistency has provoked criticism, both from 
the SPDC and the opposition. It has also led to power struggles and defections within 
NMSP ranks (see below). 
 
Having agreed to a cessation of hostilities, the NMSP leadership had no clear vision of 
the party’s future role (South, in Gravers 2007). Many of those who supported the 
agreement saw no option, other than to pursue a new, closer relationship with the 
military government; others remained sympathetic to the armed and political 
opposition, and proposed an open alliance with the NLD. In the context of such 
debates, a new Mon umbrella group emerged, following a Congress of Mon National 
Affairs held the year after the ceasefire (South 2005: ch.16). The Mon Unity League 
(MUL) went on to play an important role in Mon politics, acting as a link between the 
NMSP, Burmese and Mon groups in Thailand and overseas, and the growing 
international campaign for democratic change in Burma. In 20007 the MUL was re-
organized, to focus on promoting the activities of Mon grass roots and civil society 
organizations. The previous year had seen the launch of a new Mon umbrella political 
organization, the Mon Affairs Union (MAU), in which the NMSP played a leading role.  
 
Intra-Mon Conflict Since the Ceasefire 
Since 1995, a total of five ex- MNLA factions have split from NMSP, and several more 
small anti-ceasefire local militias have emerged, especially in those parts of Ye and 
Yebyu Townships from which the NMSP was forced to withdraw following the 
ceasefire. The most significant of these has been the Hongsawatoi Restoration Party 
(HRP; later, the Mon Restoration Party), led by veteran NMSP Central Committee 
member, Colonel Nai Pan Nyunt (ibid. ch.19-20). 
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Nai Pan Nyunt went back to war on 9 September 2001, taking about 150 MNLA troops 
with him. He claimed that his primary reason for defecting from the NMSP was its 
leaders’ inability to prevent the confiscation of Mon lands (see below), particularly in 
villages previously under his control. The NMSP however, accused him of instigating 
rebellion to avoid facing corruption charges brought against him by the party 
leadership.  
 
From positions on the frontiers of the main NMSP ceasefire zone, Nai Pan Nyunt’s men 
harassed the Tatmadaw, while negotiating an alliance with another anti-ceasefire 
faction, the Mon National Defence Army (MNDA - or ‘Mon National Warrior Army’).  
The emergence of another anti-ceasefire faction, so close to its headquarters, 
threatened the basis of the NMSP’s truce with the SPDC. Some party activists, and 
many MNLA veterans, joined forces with Nai Pan Nyunt; others sensed an opportunity 
for the NMSP to throw off the much-resented ceasefire agreement, and return to a 
policy of outright, armed opposition to the SPDC. 
 
On 29 November 2001 Nai Pa Nyunt’s faction united with the MNDA to form the HRP, 
and the Monland Restoration Army (MRA), fielding more than 300 troops. The new 
force began collecting taxes on the road and in villages near Three Pagodas Pass, and 
was soon recruiting in the area, and laying landmines (as was the MNLA). 
 
With several MNLA-HRP - and Tatmadaw-HRP - clashes reported January-March 2002, 
the future of the Mon ceasefire looked highly precarious. However, by the end of the 
year, loyal MNLA troops had expelled the main HRP force from the vicinity of the 
ceasefire zones, and Nai Pan Nyunt’s men found themselves either trapped along the 
border, or pushed back into the MNDA base areas in southern Ye Township.  
 
By late-2003 the HRP rebellion had all but petered out. Many troops returned to the 
MNLA, while Nai Pan Nyunt and a few followers moved down to the old NMSP Mergui 
District base in Tenasserim Division, 280 miles (450km) to the south (opposite 
Thailand’s Prachuab Kiri Kahn Province) - an area from which the MNLA had withdrawn 
under the 1995 ceasefire agreement. The rump HRP continued to receive some support 
from Mon exile groups overseas and in Thailand (including some radical monks).  
 
Nai Pan Nyunt re-formed his group as the Mon Restoration Party (MRP) in August 2007, 
and began to collect taxes from the long-suffering villagers of southern Ye Township 
(IMNA 1-9-2007). However, by now this small outfit was marginal to the larger Mon and 
Burmese political scene. Nevertheless, with the MRP replacing (and absorbing) the 
remnants of the MNDA in Ye Township, the Tatmadaw continued to abuse the human 
rights abuses of villagers in the area, with impunity (see, for example, The Mon Forum 
February 2007).5 
                                                 
5 The decline in Nai Pan Nyunt’s fortunes was symbolized by a horrific event which occurred on 
18 September 2004 (the sixteenth anniversary of the SLORC), and epitomized the sort of ugly 
local conflicts which have for half-a-century undermined the solidarity of Burma’s ethnic 
nationalist movements. That morning, a unit of the KNLA’s 11 Battalion stormed the HRP 
headquarters near Nong Hoi, killing all five of Nai Pan Nyunt’s daughters, and two Mon soldiers, 
and injuring the HRP chairman and his wife (IMNA 20-9-2004). Although this killing has never 
been properly investigated, it seems to have been spurred by a conflict of economic interests, 
centered around territorial control, and the taxation of local villages.  
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Other Mon splinter groups still active in 2007 included remnants of the Mon Army 
Mergui District (MAMD), based south of the Maw Dawng Pass in Tenasserim Division 
(South 2005: ch.17). The MAMD had split from the NMSP the year after the ceasefire, 
and subsequently made its own deal with the Tatmadaw in June 1997. Based in three 
villages in the Chaung Chee area, the MAMD sent one delegate to the National 
Convention. A very small ‘Mon Peace Group’ based on the southern Tenasserim coast 
also sent one delegate to the convention.  
 
 
Post-Ceasefire Rights Violations in Mon States 
According to the TBBC and Mon Relief and Development Committee (MRDC), the 
population of the Mon ceasefire zones in 2006 was about 60,000 people - including 
some 2000 newly-arrived internally displaced persons (IDPs), who had fled human 
rights violations since 2005 (TBBC 2006).6 In August 2005, the Human Rights Foundation 
of Monland (HURFOM) reported that the following abuses were prevalent in Monland 
(especially in non-ceasefire areas of southern Mon State): extra-judicial, summary or 
arbitrary executions; arbitrary detention; torture and other cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment; rape and sexual violation of women; forced labor on road 
construction, in army and police camps, and on infrastructure projects; forced 
portering for the Tatmadaw; land confiscation; movement restrictions; and denial of 
the right to education. 
 
Land Rights Violations 
Some of the most serious post-ceasefire problems in Mon State related to Housing, 
Land and Property (HLP) rights. In October 2003 the HURFOM published No Land to 
Farm, a report documenting the confiscation of 7,780 acres of land from Mon farmers, 
between 1998-2002. Adding insult to injury, farmers were often forced to work on the 
confiscated lands, building barracks and growing crops for the Tatmadaw. Some 
affected households retained limited access to their lands - usually on payment of a 




Notwithstanding the many problematic developments, there have been some 
important ‘peace dividends’ since the ceasefire. Among the most significant of these 
has been the re-emergence of ‘civil society’ networks among Mon communities.8 
                                                 
6 For an analysis of patterns of forced migration in Burma, see South (2007). 
7 For a detailed analysis of post-ceasefire developments in Mon areas, see South, in Gravers 
(2007). 
8 The concept of ‘civil society’ used here is derived primarily from de Tocqueville (1994), and 
denotes voluntary, autonomous associations and networks which are intermediate between the 
state and the family, and concerned with public ends. These include a broad range of CBOs and 
NGOs, media and social welfare organizations, as well as religious and cultural groups 
(traditional and modern), and more overtly political organizations. However, commercial 
companies, and political parties seeking to assume state power, are not part of civil society - 
although they may promote or inhibit its development. From a Gramscian perspective, civil 
society is conceived of as a contested realm, in which competing forces and interest groups 
seek to establish positions, in a protracted struggle for power (Gramsci 1971). Functioning civil 
society networks are essential for the achievement of ‘bottom-up’ social and political 
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Along the Border 
As noted above, the ideals of democracy have not always reflected in the practices of 
armed ethnic groups in Burma. However, in recent years, civil society networks have 
begun to expand in some non-government controlled areas. The decline of Burma’s 
main insurgent groups, in the 1980s and ‘90s, opened the space for the emergence of 
new and more participatory forms of social and political organization within opposition 
ethnic nationality communities. A number of NGOs were organized by Chin, Kachin, 
Shan, Lahu, Karenni, Karen, Tavoyan, Mon and all-Burma student and youth, women’s, 
environmental and human rights groups in the border areas.  
 
Representing new models of organization, these networks constituted one of the most 
dynamic aspects in an otherwise bleak political scene. As a result of their activities, 
those engaged in the struggle for ethnic rights and self-determination in Burma were 
obliged to acknowledge the importance of women’s rights, community-level 
participation and democratic practices - not just as distant goals, but as on-going 
processes. 
 
A particularly dynamic sub-sector of the border-based local NGO scene was composed 
of cross-border relief and development groups. In the early 1990s, Karen - and later 
Chin, Shan, Karenni and Mon - teams began to provide humanitarian relief, and 
undertake some community development and educational work, among displaced 
communities, in what had once been the ‘liberated zones’ (behind the front-lines of 
war), but were now mostly zones of on-going armed conflict (or ceasefire zones). In 
doing, so they helped to develop community networks of trust and support, and to 
strengthen civil society, under the most difficult of conditions (South 2007 & 2008: 
ch.6).  
 
In the case of the Mon ‘refugees’, in the decade following their forcible repatriation in 
1995-96, the TBBC and other INGOs worked with the MRDC to develop basic 
infrastructure (schools, bridges, wells and hospitals) in the resettlement areas, as well 
as supporting community-based projects, and providing humanitarian supplies (rice 
and medicines).9 In mid-2007 the MRDC reported that 11,649 people were living at four 
main NMSP-controlled resettlement sites (MRDC July 2007). Most of these people 
                                                                                                                                                 
transition in Burma, and for conflict resolution at both the national and local levels. In order 
for democratic change to be sustainable, the country’s diverse social and ethnic communities 
will have to enjoy a sense of ownership in any transitional process, and equip themselves to fill 
the power vacuum that may emerge, either as a result of abrupt shifts in national politics, or 
of a more gradual withdrawal of the military from state and local power. Such an approach 
involves a broad understanding of democratization, including community participation, and the 
promotion of civil society as an engine for change. For an analysis of the strategic roles of civil 
society actors in Burma, see South (2004). 
9 In 2005 (following their withdrawal from the Karen refugee camps in Thailand), MSF-France 
were blocked by the Thai authorities from working across the border, in the Mon ceasefires 
zones (where they had been active since the mid-1990s). When MSF withdrew at the end of the 
year, the Mon returnees were left without medical support, in an area characterized by very 
high levels of drug-resistant malaria. Fortunately, in 2007 the TBBC mobilized a small group of 
INGOs and donors, to respond to this health crisis. However, in order to encourage the Mon 
returnees to grow more of their own food, the TBBC’s support to this population was pegged at 
60% of estimated needs (IMNA 20-6-2007). 
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remained in limbo, living in camp-like conditions just over the border, with only 
limited access to agricultural land.10  
 
Meanwhile, the majority of Mon civilians - including most of those in the NMSP-
controlled ceasefire zones - lived in longer-established (‘organic’) villages, beyond the 
resettlement sites. For many of these people, the post-ceasefire period had seen 
increased agricultural production, and new opportunities to trade across the former 
front-lines of conflict. 
 
Inside Burma 
As noted, the ceasefires are not peace treaties, and generally lack all but the most 
rudimentary accommodation of the ex-insurgents’ political and developmental 
demands. Furthermore, ethnic nationalist cadres are generally more familiar with the 
‘top-down’ approaches used in military and political campaigns, than with ‘bottom-up’ 
development and conflict resolution methods. As elsewhere in the country, local 
initiatives are frequently undermined by poor governance, parallel exploitative 
practices, and a lack of strategic planning and implementation capacities. 
Nevertheless, the ceasefires have created some opportunities for the reconstruction of 
war-torn communities.  
 
According to the Human Rights Foundation of Monland’s Mon Forum (May 2005): 
 
“although there have been many negative developments after the 1995 ceasefire 
between the NMSP and SPDC… the people in Mon areas could travel and communicate 
easily and could launch the community’s practices more than before the ceasefire. This 
is also the positive development after ceasefire for the Mon CBOs.” 
 
Examples of Community-based Organizations (CBOs) in Burma include farmer field 
schools and other rural interest groups, village development committees, community 
savings groups, early childhood centres, and local Parent-Teacher Associations. A 
ground-breaking survey conducted in 2003-04 by Brian Heidel, of Save the Children UK, 
found that some 214,000 CBOs were operating throughout the country, plus a total of 
270 local NGOs.  
 
A number of Mon CBOs and NGOs have been active in the fields of culture, community 
development and education. For example, since the ceasefire, the NMSP-affiliated 
Mon Women’s Organization (MWO) has succeeded in extending its income generation, 
adult literacy and other training activities beyond the NMSP-controlled zones, to Mon 
communities across lower Burma. Efforts to promote gender equity within the male-
dominated NMSP received a small boost in 2006, when the party selected its first 
woman Central Committee member, who was given responsibility for running the 
Education Department.   
 
Like the KIO and other armed ethnic groups, the NMSP administers a substantial 
education system, which relies on both community and international donor support. 
Despite some serious setbacks, during the 2006-07 school year the party managed to 
run 186 Mon National Schools and 189 ‘mixed’ schools (shared with the state system), 
attended by nearly 58,236 pupils (NMSP 2007), 70% of whom lived in government-
                                                 
10 From north to south, the Mon resettlement sites were located at Halochanee (near Three 
Pagodas Pass), Che Deik, Bee Ree (near the NMSP HQ, or ‘Central’) and Tavoy District. 
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controlled areas. Students who pass through the NMSP-run high schools were able to 
sit government matriculation exams, and enter the state higher education system.  
 
The success of the NMSP education system has served to bolster the party’s standing 
and perceived legitimacy within the Mon community. It is therefore not surprising that 
local Tatmadaw commanders and government officials often moved to close down Mon 
National Schools. Although this suppression is well-documented (e.g. The Mon Forum 
January & December 2005), most of these schools re-opened after a short hiatus, or 
were replaced by new Mon National Schools opening elsewhere. (However, since 2005, 
the NMSP schools have come under renewed and concerted pressure by the state 
authorities.) 
 
Although the NMSP and other ceasefire groups have provided the political and military 
space within which civil society re-emerged after the ceasefires, the key actors have 
often come from religious and social welfare networks. These include ethnic minority 
literature and culture promotion groups, many of which were established in the 1950s, 
only to be suppressed after 1962, and then re-emerge in the context of the ceasefires. 
 
For example, long before the NMSP ceasefire, Mon literacy training and cultural 
education had been organized, on an ad hoc basis, by individual monasteries across 
Mon State. The year after the truce, between April-May 1996, about 10,000 students 
received training under the auspices of a new Mon Literature and Buddhist Culture 
Association (MLBCA), working together with the Mon Literature and Culture Committee 
(MLCC). The trainees studied Mon language, culture and ethno-history, sitting 
competitive exams in each of these subjects. By 1997, nearly 27,000 students 
participated, and by 2000 the number had risen to 46,435 (Mon Language Literacy 
Training Course 2005 Report). Despite some attempts by the government and military 
authorities to restrict their activities, over the next few years the MLBCA extended the 
literacy trainings from the countryside to several towns across Mon State. By 2006, 
63,310 state school students (60% of them girls), studied Mon in over one hundred 
monasteries and schools, in 14 township across lower Burma (Mon and Karen States, 
and Tenasserim Division).   
 
Only a small proportion of the funds for this major initiative came from foreign 
donors, the rest being raised within the community, at pagoda festivals etc. Members 
of the sangha in particular were able to mobilize the Mon community to support the 
literacy programme, while at the same time negotiating with the military authorities 
to allow the trainings to go ahead.  
 
In June 2007 reports began to emerge that the township authorities in Mon State were 
refusing to allow Literature and Culture Associations to renew their official 
registration (IMNA 6-6-2007). It seemed that the military regime was moving to 
suppress autonomous civil society (and potential political) actors, in the run-up to a 
possible referendum and elections, following the completion of National Convention 
(South 2008: ch.6).11 The military regime is likely to step up its suppression of ‘grass 
                                                 
11 Another vibrant sector of Mon civil society since the ceasefire has been among artists and 
traditional performance troupes. More explicitly ethno-nationalist activities are conducted by 
Mon National Day celebration committees - although the authorities generally restricted the 
celebration to the boundaries of Mon State. 
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roots’ organisation and civil society actors, following the events of August-October 
2007, when the Buddhist sangha were at the forefront of popular protests against the 
military regime (see below).  
 
 
The National Convention 
Since its refusal to recognize the popular will of the Burmese people, as reflected in 
the results of the May 1990 election, the military government has resisted all options 
but a managed (by the military) transition to some type of ‘disciplined’ or ‘guided’ (by 
the military) democracy. On 30 August 2003 Burma’s newly-appointed prime minister 
(and Military Intelligence chief), General Khin Nyunt, announced the resumption of a 
National Convention to draft a new constitution, followed by a referendum and 
eventual elections - as part of a seven-stage ‘road-map to democracy’. (Burma has had 
two previous constitutions, promulgated in 1947, and in 1974 - under which a Mon 
State was demarcated.)  
 
The SPDC was clearly positioning itself to control a transitional process, the perceived 
legitimacy of which would depend on who participated in the National Convention, 
under what conditions, and how the resulting constitution was endorsed and 
promulgated. Despite serious misgivings in many quarters, Khin Nyunt’s ‘road-map’ 
became the only political in town - at least at the national-elite level of politics. 
 
Three days before the National Convention re-opened, on May 14 2004, Burma’s two 
main opposition parties announced that they would not join the proceedings (although 
hey had not in fact been invited). The government had failed either to release Aung 
San Suu Kyi, or to reassure the NLD and UNA that it would permit genuine debate over 
key issues. The convention was therefore widely perceived as illegitimate - both inside 
Burma and abroad.  
 
The Ceasefire Groups Make their Move 
While the UNA parties (including the MNDF) made common cause with the NLD, and 
boycotted the National Convention, most of the ceasefire groups participated - 
initially, with a sense of guarded optimism. This was to be the most important 
national-level political arena since the 1990 election - and perhaps even since the 
military takeover of 1962. While the National Convention was unlikely to result in an 
acceptable political settlement to the country’s many problems, it would at least 
provide a forum for the ceasefire groups’ to promote the ethnic nationalist agenda.  
 
Most of the 1,076 delegates to the National Convention were hand-picked by the 
government. Therefore, the over one hundred representatives from twenty-eight 
ceasefire groups were among the few participants who could claim some 
independence from the regime. 
 
Although the ceasefire groups were a mixed bunch, they did share a number of 
common concerns. In their deliberations at the National Convention they were able to 
develop coherent positions on several key issues. If nothing else, the ceasefire groups’ 
participation in the convention created opportunities to focus on the centrality of the 
‘ethnic question’ in Burmese politics. Whether or not their demands were accepted, in 




In June 2004 representatives from thirteen ceasefire groups, led by the NMSP and KIO, 
made a joint submission to the National Convention outlining their main demands. This 
document called for the promulgation of state constitutions, proposed that all residual 
powers lie at the state level (rather than with central government), and demanded the 
formation of local ethnic security forces (a new role for the ceasefire armies). 
Although rather vague in parts, the ceasefire groups’ demands included formation of a 
federal union of Burma, under the rubric of ‘ethnic or national democracy’. However, 
they were soon informed that their proposals would not be included on the 
convention’s plenary agenda. They were told that - as the National Convention was 
recalled to conclude the work suspended in 1996, and to propagate the regime’s 104 
proposals - their submissions would be noted, but not included in the draft 
constitution.12  
 
The Consequences of Regime Consolidation 
In a dramatic development, which caught most observers by surprise, in October 2004 
Khin Nyunt and his Military Intelligence network were purged - thus consolidating the 
power of Senior General Than Shwe. The ceasefire groups had been among Khin 
Nyunt’s major clients; the existence of these agreements lent the ex-prime minister 
considerable kudos and political power. After his fall, Tatmadaw field commanders in 
border areas inherited responsibility for relations with the ceasefire groups, and were 
given scope to move against non-compliant organisations, as the opportunity arose.13  
 
The fall of Khin Nyunt reinforced expectations that the SPDC would eventually order 
the ceasefire groups to give up their weapons - possibly on promulgation of the new 
constitution. Senior Tatmadaw commanders generally considered the continued 
existence of armed non-state groups as an affront to their authority. The SPDC was 
therefore serious in its intent to disarm the ceasefire groups, sooner or later. This was 
perhaps the issue that was most likely to provoke a re-newel of armed conflict.  If and 
when the government forced the issue of disarmament, some ceasefire groups might 
re-invent themselves as government-orientated militias, or local police forces - in 
which case any surrender of arms would be largely symbolic. However, the NMSP, KIO, 
UWSA and some other organizations had indicated that they would not accept 
disarmament by the military government - although it was always possible that a few 
old weapons and ammunition stockpiles could be decommissioned. A probable scenario 
was that, if/when they were ordered to disarm, elements of most ceasefire groups 
                                                 
12 On 13 February 2005 six ceasefire groups, including the NMSP, issued a statement, repeating 
their demands at the National Convention the previous year, and calling for a review of the 
draft constitution’s Principle No. 6, which provided for the military to continue to play a 
leading role in politics. They also asked for non-ceasefire groups to be granted observer status 
at the convention, and for the proceedings’ minutes to record dissenting views. 
13 In late April 2005 two battalions of the SSNA ceasefire group were pressured by the 
Tatmadaw Northeast Command into surrendering their weapons. Then, on 29 April, another 
northern Shan State-based ceasefire group, the (ex-NDF) Palaung State Liberation Army (PSLA), 
was also forced to surrender its weapons. The military government seemed to be intent on 
picking-off the ceasefire groups one-by-one, persuading the smaller and less well organized 
militias to disarm first - before perhaps moving on to the better established Wa, Kachin, Mon 
and other forces. In response to these developments, in late June the SSNA leader, Colonel Sai 
Yi, took three battalions (but only a hundred-or-so men) back to war with Yangon, merging his 
forces with the SSA-South. This was the first time in a decade that a ceasefire group had 
resumed armed conflict with the military government. 
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would comply, while other units (in some cases, the majority of the ceasefire group’s 
forces) would resume armed conflict. 
 
In the meantime, since 2005 Tatmadaw commanders have been stricter than their 
Military Intelligence predecessors, in their interpretation of the ceasefire agreements. 
For example, the MNLA has found its troop movements increasingly restricted, and 
several ceasefire groups have had their engagement in tax collection activities 
curtailed. 
 
Meanwhile, in response to criticism from the ethnic communities they seek to 
represent, a few ceasefire groups have grappled with internal reform. The NMSP and 
KIO in particular have demonstrated a degree of democratic political culture, 
reflecting their twenty years of participation in pro-democracy alliances, such as the 
NDF and DAB.  
 
Policy-making within NMSP leadership circles usually involves a degree of debate and 
disagreement - which has sometimes resulted in damaging schisms and splits. 
However, the party has proved fairly responsive to pressure from constituencies inside 
Burma, and from overseas-based exile and activist groups (which are often 
disproportionately represented in public advocacy). Since the late 1990s, both the 
NMSP and KIO have attempted to elicit public participation in decision-making, by 
consulting with religious and civil society leaders from their communities, regarding 
whether and how to engage with the military government.  
 
For example, the Kao Wao News Agency (23-9-06) reports that, over the 2006 rainy 
season, the NMSP leadership “sought out public opinion on whether it should attend 
the National Convention." The following year, the party held a further series of public 
meetings, in order to gauge the feeling of the Mon community (IMNA 3-9-2007). The 
NMSP was in a particularly difficult position. The three small blocks of territory 
granted it under the June 1995 ceasefire agreement were vulnerable to Tatmadaw 
incursion. Neighbouring Thailand, whose security establishment had helped to push 
the NMSP into the ceasefire, was unlikely to be sympathetic to any resumption of 
armed conflict in Mon areas. Furthermore, the party was militarily weak, and had few 
financial resources with which to wage a sustained military campaign. 
 
Despite these constraints, the NMSP has been the most outspoken of the ceasefire 
groups. Indeed, since December 2005, the party has refused to endorse the National 
Convention, sending only a small team of ‘observers’ to the forum. Although some 
activists would have liked the party to go further in its defiance of the government, 
the NMSP could have done little more, without definitively breaking the ceasefire - 
and bringing humanitarian disaster to Mon State.  
 
From Convention to Constitution? 
In early June 2007 the SPDC announced that the final session of the National 
Convention would begin on 18 July. Asked about the conventions’ resumption, a senior 
NMSP leader quoted by the Independent Mon News Agency (IMNA 12-6-07) said that the 
party “harbours no hope from the National Convention.” The same month, on the 
twelfth anniversary of the NMSP-SLORC ceasefire (IMNA 29-6-07), Nai Hongsa, the 
party’s General Secretary, stated that: 
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“the ceasefire is in a deadlock. The relationship between us and the junta is not good 
but there is still no serious pressure. It means both sides are trying to maintain the 
ceasefire agreement.” 
 
A few days before the National Convention re-started for the last time, a coalition of 
twelve UNA member-parties (elected in 1990) urged “the military regime to draft a 
true constitution that creates a union” (The Irrawaddy 12-7-2007: 
www.irrawaddy.org), along the lines envisioned at Panglong in 1947.14 In the 
meantime, relations between the SPDC and several other ceasefire groups (including 
the Wa) were also to deteriorating. Nevertheless, the government still seemed intent 
on buying ceasefire group support for the constitution drafting process, by offering 
concessions over the issues of most concern to ethnic nationalist communities - such as 
regional autonomy, language use and local control over resources. This strategy would 
allow the government to dilute ethnic State-level demands, by offering concessions to 
several relatively small groups, at the Sub-state level. It would also expose long-
standing tensions between the post-1988, predominantly urban-based democracy 
movement (which was determined to see a democratically elected central 
government), and the movement for ethnic rights, dating from the years before 
independence. 
 
Alan Smith, one of the most astute analysts of constitutional issues in Burma, has 
worked on strategy with a number of key ethnic nationalist actors, including both 
National Convention delegates, and those who have boycotted the process. He notes 
(2007) that the creation of ethnic State legislatures may actually facilitate the 
participation of local political and civil society organizations, in at least some sectors 
of public life. According to this view, any constitution is better than continued direct 
rule by the military. Although the space available to ethnic nationality and other 
parties under the new constitution is likely to be very limited, it will at least allow 
them to participate in above-ground politics, from ‘within the legal fold’. 
 
In the meantime, it was unclear how the next stage of the SPDC’s ‘road-map to 
democracy’ would proceed, after the National Convention concluded its deliberations 
on 3 September 2007. During the final session, delegates discussed the role of political 
parties, conditions for declaration of a state of emergency, and creation of the 
national flag and anthem. Presumably, these and the other elements of the draft 
constitution would be edited into a document, to be presented to the Burmese people 
in some kind of referendum. However, the events of September-October 2007 made it 
likely that any proposals presented by the SPDC, even in the form of a tightly-
controlled referendum, would be rejected by a fearful but angry populace.  
 
‘The Saffron Revolution’ 
The military government - which has ruled Burma, in one form or another, for forty-
five years - remains deeply unpopular. However, the Tatmadaw is the most cohesive 
and powerful institution in Burma, dominating many aspects of political, economic and 
                                                 
14 Among the ceasefire groups, the KIO took the lead, by presenting a detailed proposal, 
outlining a series of amendments to the draft charter. This nineteen-point document (KIO July 
2007) called for changes to the proposed state structure and legislative powers, to allow 
greater autonomy for ethnic nationality areas. Indeed, the KIO urged “in the strongest sense 
possible, that a specific constitutional mandate be included for a federal system of union” 
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social (even cultural) life in this beautiful but troubled country. In many respects, the 
Tatmadaw is the state – and it is fearsomely jealous of this prerogative. 
 
In August and September 2007 members of the 88 ‘Generation’ of student activists led 
a series of small demonstrations in Yangon and some other urban centres, in protest 
against a huge increase in fuel prices, caused when the government removed state 
subsidies on 15 August. The fuel price rise had a devastating impact on many sectors 
of the already impoverished population, especially in urban areas (where annual 
inflation was at least 40%) - illustrating the degree to which livelihoods had been 
eroded under the SLORC-SPDC. In late August and September about 180 protest 
leaders were arrested by the authorities - an action which was condemned by most 
western governments.  
 
Although many (perhaps the great majority) of citizens supported these brave actions, 
most were too fearful of the well-entrenched military regime to participate directly in 
the demonstrations. However, the situation changed in early September when - at first 
in parts of central-northern Burma, and later in the month on the streets of Yangon 
and Mandalay – hundreds, and then thousands, of monks took part in the protests 
against the government, chanting the metta [loving kindness] sutra as they marched. 
For several days, the saffron-robed monks’ protest went unmolested by state security 
forces. Indeed, on 22 September they were even allowed to meet briefly with Aung 
San Suu Kyi – exchanging words across the locked gates of her compound (where ‘the 
lady’ remained under house arrest).  
 
Over the following days, large numbers of civilians began to join the protesting monks. 
While the Tatmadaw might be reluctant to open fire on the sangha, the soldiers had 
no such compunction when the monks were joined by tens of thousands of other 
civilians. Starting on 26 September, the security forces conducted a series of night 
raids against the most activists monasteries in and around Yangon, arresting hundreds 
of monks (many of whom were subsequently released – although others were 
reportedly killed). During this period, the government also cracked-down on the 
protestors (who were no longer protected by the presence among them of large 
numbers of monks). Estimates of the number of people killed, since the violence 
escalated on 27 September, vary from ten (according to government sources) to some 
two hundred (according to some opposition activists, based on eye-witness accounts); 
many hundreds more were arrested (Associated Press 4-10-2007). 
 
Images of the demonstration, and the subsequent brutal crack-down, were broadcast 
around the world, on the web, and especially by Burma’s intrepid bloggers (at least 
until the authorities closed down most people’s access to the internet). In response, 
the UN Secretary General’s Special Representative to Myanmar, Ibrahim Gambari 
visited the country, and was able to meet with Aug San Suu Kyi and (eventually, after 
a somewhat humiliating delay), with Gen. Than Shwe. However, the SPDC’s 
subsequent offer to hold only conditional talks with Daw Suu Kyi revealed the UN’s 
lack of leverage with the SPDC, despite the renewed attentions of the Security 
Council.  
 
The suppression of the ‘saffron revolution’ marked a huge set-back for 
democratisation in Burma. While it illustrated the potential power of civil society and 
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the sangha , the spontaneous demonstrations also signalled the marginalisation of 
exile and most other opposition groups, who played little part in the protests.  
 
 
Legitimacy, Ethnicity and Territory  
The events of August-October 2007 radically undermined the military government’s 
claims to legitimacy. The standing of other parties is somewhat less clear.  
 
The claims of Burma’s armed ethnic groups to be the sole legitimate representatives 
of ‘their’ communities have long been problematic (Robinne and Sadan 2007). 
Insurgent elites and opposition politicians enjoy differing degrees of (often contested) 
legitimacy among the communities they seek to represent. They tend to be motivated 
by a combination of deeply-held political and social beliefs, and varying measures of 
political and economic opportunism (i.e. most individuals and organizations are 
characterized by a complex and shifting combination of ‘greed and grievance’). 
 
The notion of armed conflict waged in the name of a particular ethnic group is 
problematic in other ways also. As Leach argued half a century ago, vis-à-vis the 
Kachin and Shan, ethnicity is not an essential characteristic, but is relational. As 
noted, the idea that ethnicity is a ‘natural’ (or primordial) quality of individuals or 
groups of people is derived from colonial era classifications, viewed through the lens 
of more than fifty years of bitter conflict.  
 
The fixation with ethnicity in Burma has led to a conflation of ethno-linguistic nation, 
political state and homeland territory, translating socio-cultural heritage onto a 
geographic landscape. As Gravers notes (2007: 13), “the major difference between the 
pre-colonial period and the present is that ethnicity … has become … mapped in the 
modern nation state.” Often based on ideas of a ‘pure’ ethnic homeland, the close 
association of ethnicity and territoriality has had bloody inter- and intra-national 
history over the past two centuries (Hobsbawm 1990). The homeland has often been 
perceived by members of the dominant nationality as theirs alone, consigning (‘other’) 
minority groups to the status of outsiders. In Burma, the identification of ethnicity 
with a particular territory has resulted in sometimes highly unrealistic territorial 
claims.  
 
For Mon nationalists, the desire to restore the glories (and even the supposed 
frontiers) of the pre-colonial ‘Ramanyadesa’ has sometimes obscured the fact that the 
relatively small contemporary Mon population has little realistic future, other than as 
part of the Union of Burma. Particularly given the proximity of Mon-populated areas to 
the central Burman-populated heartlands, the project of a wholly independent 
Monland is hardly viable.  
 
While the military government continues to promote a strong, unitary state as the 
solution to Burma’s ‘problem of diversity’, conflict is likely to persist. In response, 
ethno-nationalists have explored a range of approaches to ‘unity amid diversity’.   
 
 
Federalism and Elections 
In the 1970s and ‘80s the NMSP, KNU, KIO and allies worked hard to establish the 
ethnic insurgencies on a coherent (non-communist) political footing. The formation of 
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the NDF in 1976 was a major achievement, which for the first time instituted 
federalism as the basis of the ethno-nationalist platform. However, in the 1990s the 
federalist position was modified by the inclusion of new political demands, emanating 
from the urban-based (predominantly Burman) democracy movement.  
 
In a January 2007 lecture in Stockholm, given on the occasion of receiving the Martin 
Luther King Prize, Dr Lian Sakhong, General Secretary of the ENC, called for a re-
conceptualization of Burmese politics. He stated that ‘nation-building’ of a kind which 
involves notions of "one ethnicity, one language and one religion" is inappropriate to a 
multi-ethnic society, such as Burma. Dr Lian instead proposed a model of ‘state-
building’ in which "the state knows only citizens no matter what nationality each 
individual belongs to, no matter what kind of religious belief he or she worships, no 
matter what kind of language he or she speaks." He also stated that “the only solution 
… is to establish a genuine Federal Union of Burma, which will guarantee the 
fundamental rights for all citizens of the Union”.  
 
Federal systems are characterized by power-sharing (or mixed sovereignty) 
arrangements, between a central (federal) government and constituent (state) 
governments. This apparently simple formulation raises questions regarding the type 
of federalism that is best suited to Burma’s complex society.  
 
Two sets of approach coalesce around notions of ‘territorial’ or ‘rights-based’ (or 
‘corporate’) federalism. The former identifies particular ethno-linguistic groups with 
specific territories - as proposed in the draft constitutions developed by the NCUB and 
ENC (see Yawnghwe & Sakhong 2003, and Williams & Sakhong 2005). The identification 
of ethnicity with territory (albeit with very different permutations of power) is also 
central to the SPDC’s constitution-drafting process.  
 
Inspired by the ‘spirit’ of the 1947 Panglong Agreement, the NCUB charter proposes 
the establishment of eight ethnic states - including one for the Burmans - each with a 
legislative assembly. According to this model, ethnic self-determination is tied to 
control over spatially-bounded ‘homeland’ territories (e.g. Mon State), within which it 
is assumed that the Mon (for example) constitute the majority. This formulation 
includes provision for minorities within a particular State (e.g. Karen in Mon State, and 
vice versa), through the creation of local sub-states (Yawnghwe & Sakhong 2003: 107). 
 
In contrast to exclusively territorial solutions, models of rights-based (or corporate) 
federalism are more flexible: people of a particular ethnicity (e.g. the Mon) would 
retain certain rights - for example, regarding language use and political self-
determination - wherever they live (South 2008: ch.7). However, such models of 
formally symmetrical federalism are only one of way of safeguarding “the fundamental 
rights for all citizens of the Union” (to quote Dr Lian). Alan Smith (2005 & 2007) has 
explored other forms of de-centralization, appropriate to a diverse and a multiethnic 
state such as Burma. These include various types of asymmetrical territorial 
arrangement, such as local autonomy. 
 
In practice, since the mid-1990s, the NMSP and other ceasefire groups have enjoyed a 
variety of different types and degrees of (asymmetrical) regional autonomy, under 
their agreements with the military government. (The insurgent-controlled liberated 
zones also demonstrated de facto local autonomy, until the majority were overrun in 
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the 1980s and ‘90s.) The challenge facing these non-state actors is how to safeguard 
the forms of local (elite) control they currently enjoy, under new arrangements which 
may emerge out of the government-controlled constitution-drafting process (or in the 
unlikely event of the opposition alliance being able to implement its draft federal 
constitution). In considering their strategic options, ethnic nationality leaders would 
be wise not to focus exclusively on territorial-based federalism, but consider the full 
range of structures for self-determination, including aspects of corporate federalism, 
and de-centralization.  
 
The great majority of the Mon population - living beyond the ceasefire zones - will be 
largely unaffected by the NMSP’s territorial calculations. Of more concern to these 
communities is the degree to which they are able to exercise basic rights, and enjoy 
human security. As Smith (2007: 207) notes, sustainable conflict resolution in Burma 
requires more than simple territorial autonomy for ethnic minority/nationality groups. 
It is also necessary to reform the state’s abusive treatment of its citizens, and to 
explore a new politics, which “can satisfy the demands of a complex multiethnic, 
multilingual and multicultural society.” Such an approach would move beyond a 
fixation with territory, to focus on rights-based issues and processes of 
democratization more generally. 
 
It seems unlikely that the government-controlled constitution-drafting process will 
result in a charter which includes significant elements of the federalist platform. 
Whatever its deficiencies however, any future election will confer at least a degree of 
legitimacy upon those elected. Ethnic nationalist elites and their communities are 
therefore likely to be faced with a dilemma, regarding whether and how to participate 
in any elections which may be organized by the SPDC (under a new charter or 
otherwise). 
 
A further set of issues will involve whether to support all-Burma parties (such as the 
NLD), or to endorse for specifically ethno-nationalist groups - raising the subsidiary 
issue of tactical voting and the formation of electoral alliances. Historically, elites 
representing some ethnic groups, such as the Mon, have successfully competed in 
elections in Burma (e.g. in the 1950s and in 1990), while others, such as the Karen, 
have not.  
 
A significant indicator for the future will be whether the ceasefire groups are prepared 
to risk testing their electoral popularity. In June 2007 an NMSP official told the BBC 
that the SPDC had asked the party to compete in elections in 2008 (BBC online 4-6-
2007: http://www.bbc.co.uk/burmese.shtml). In August the government began to 
register (and issue identity cards to) the residents of Kachin, Mon and other ceasefire 
zones, reportedly in preparation for the registration of voters (The Irrawaddy 5-9-2007 
and Kao Wao 7-9-07). 
 
 
Concluding Remarks  
Over the past half-century, the NMSP and other Mon armed groups have formed 
alliances with insurgent (and more recently, ceasefire) and exiled opposition 
organisations, with an emphasis on promoting the federalist cause. In contrast, the 
MNDF and other above-ground Mon groups - while also maintaining strong ethno-
nationalist positions - have cooperated with pan-Burmese (but in practice 
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urban/Burman-dominated) parties, such as the NLD. A third set of Mon socio-political 
actors have worked for gradual change at the community level, through the 
implementation of development projects.  
 
The degree of competition for influence within the Mon nationalist community, 
between armed organisations (e.g. the NMSP) and non-armed groups (e.g. the MNDF), 
should not be over-stated. There are strong linkages within and between these 
networks, and the overlapping civil society sector - all of which have come to rely on 
external (overseas-based) financial and political support (including from INGOs and 
other donors).  
 
For the MNDF, the key event of the past two decades has been the 1990s election, the 
results of which are still considered to underwrite the party’s legitimacy. For the 
NMSP, the most important ‘fact on the ground’ is the ceasefire agreement with the 
military government.  
 
The NMSP-SLORC ceasefire has produced un-even results - including the continuation 
of various rights abuses, and a return to armed conflict in some areas. Furthermore, it 
has not resulted in significant progress on the national political stage. Nevertheless 
the truce has delivered some benefits to local communities, and created the political 
space within which a re-emergent Mon civil society has begun the urgent task of re-
habilitating conflict-affected communities, building capacities for peace, and models 
of ‘democracy from below’. In general however, the NMSP has been slow to recognise 
and encourage the strategic importance of the civil society sector – which has come 
under new threat of suppression, following the events of August-October 2007.  
 
One of the most important and interesting questions, twelve years after the ceasefire, 
is what the future holds for the NMSP. The party still retains most of the 
characteristics and political culture of an insurgent organization. Will the NMSP be 
able to re-invent itself as a dynamic political party (and rival to the partly dormant 
MNDF) - or will it continue to guard the frontiers of the ‘ceasefire zone’, and exercise 
a declining influence over the wider Mon population?  
 
The latter is probably the default position - at least until the SPDC moves against the 
remaining armed groups in Burma, or the central government undergoes radical 
change. In this case, the party should re-examine its relations with the more dynamic 
elements of the Mon community in Burma and the borderlands. Rather than simply 
tolerating civil society networks, the NMSP should seek to actively promote, protects 
and facilitate their work. In this way, the de facto NMSP local government may gain 
some credit for creating the space within which grass roots democracy can re-emerge 
in Monland, while its leaders continue to call for change at the national-elite level of 
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